One striking omission in this piece: that in the Cold War, Denmark always refused[0] the US permission to base nuclear weapons in Greenland. The article puts a heavy emphasis on it being an "ideal springboard for launching U.S. nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union" (in the 1950's), but elides over *why* that did not become a thing.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Thule_Air_Base_B-52_crash... ("Thulegate" political scandal" (1968))

I don't fully agree with their thesis. I think the "nuclear war" aspect is a lot *less* strategic now then it was in the 1950-60's: "over the Arctic" is no longer the primary missile path, like it was in the early technology era. Many of them are deployed on submarines, which can launch at their target from any direction; and there are (now or soon) larger[1] land-based missiles that have enough range to go around the planet the long way, e.g. attacking the US from the south. This is, in part, strategic response to the early focus on the Arctic—both to the detection radars, and to active anti-missile defenses.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractional_Orbital_Bombardment... ("Fractional Orbital Bombardment System")

edit: And moreover, there's now satellite-based infrared sensors[2] that see rocket launches anywhere on Earth, instantly—something the early Cold War did not have. Radar is no longer the exclusive, or first, way to detect a first-strike.

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_warning_satellite

Why Greenland is of growing strategic significance