EDIT: Article seems to have been updated to remove mention of Chromium.

This article contains a lot of errors, for example Chromium on FreeBSD does NOT use Capsicum, it never has. That was experimental and invasive work done 17 years ago that was NEVER committed to their official ports repository. In fact, not a single browser on FreeBSD uses Capsicum or any form of sandboxing _at all_.

Contrast that with OpenBSD, where the Chromium port has used pledge(2) since January 2016, and unveil(2) since 2018. Both are enabled by default. Mozilla Firefox ports also use both pledge and unveil since 2018-2019, with refinements over the years.

https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-ports-cvs&m=145211683609002&w=2

https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-ports-cvs&m=153250162128188&w=2

OpenBSD's fork of tcpdump has been privsep for ~22 years, and its packet parser runs with no privileges. It's pledged tightly "stdio" and has no network/filesystem access, and uses OpenBSD specific innovations like bpf descriptor locking (BIOCLOCK) missing from both FreeBSD/Linux tcpdump today (despite FreeBSD adding the ioctl in 2005).

In the years since it was added, the reason Capsicum has only been applied to a handful of utilities is because it's a tree barren of decades worth of incremental work on privilege separation and security research.

FreeBSD Capsicum vs. Linux Seccomp Process Sandboxing